Minimum wage violations in Honduras by unknown
Ham IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:22 
DOI 10.1186/s40175-015-0045-3
ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open Access




Department of Agricultural and
Consumer Economics, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1301
W. Gregory Drive, Urbana, IL 61801,
USA
Abstract
This article studies minimum wage non-compliance in Honduras, a dual labor market
with high wage floors that are weakly enforced. However, rather than just counting
how many workers earn sub-minimum wages, it also estimates violation indices that
measure compliance at the intensive margin. I first explore cross-sectional heterogeneity
in violations using household survey data. Then, I quantify compliance adjustments to
minimum wage hikes by comparing indices before and after a large unexpected
increase. Results show substantial differences in non-compliance across industries,
location, and coverage status. Violations worsen with rising minima, but less in in more
compliant sectors.
JEL classification codes: J38, J42, O54
Keywords: Minimum wages, Compliance, Violations, Dual labor markets, Honduras
1 Introduction
Most countries protect vulnerable workers through labor market institutions, including
minimum wages.1 However, just because labor laws exist does not guarantee compli-
ance, especially when doing so is costly and their enforcement weak (Ronconi 2010).
Therefore, researchers frequently encounter that employers are paying wages belowman-
dated minima. Existing estimates report that 16–50% of developing country workers
earn sub-minimum wages (Rani et al. 2013). Moreover, this non-compliance tends to
be heterogeneous within countries, depending on institutional factors, industry-specific
attributes, location, and worker characteristics.
Unfortunately, the majority of the minimum wage literature has provided scant atten-
tion to enforcement and compliance. This is troubling because small changes in enforce-
ment may lead to vastly different consequences of minimumwage hikes (Basu et al. 2010).
Since modifying wage floors is controversial because they pose an equity-efficiency trade-
off, enforcement and compliance issues warrant further discussion because they help
determine which effect dominates.
Studies that analyze non-compliance often calculate how many workers earn less than
the minimum wage. While this measure is useful, it tells an incomplete story since indi-
viduals earning just below the minimum and those paid much less are equally weighted.
For example, a construction worker earning one percent below the minimum counts the
same as a seasonal farm worker that makes only half the wage floor. Both employees
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are underpaid but find themselves in two clearly different situations, which the standard
measure of non-compliance is unable to identify.
Bhorat et al. (2013) recently proposed using the Foster et al. (1984) poverty measures to
provide evidence on the incidence, depth, and severity of non-compliance with minimum
wages. Their use helps distinguish between compliance at extensive and intensive mar-
gins. Extensive compliance counts how many workers receive sub-minimum wages, just
like the traditional measure. Intensive compliance, however, quantifies how far individual
wages are from mandated minima. These measures are known as the family of minimum
wage violation indices.
This article estimates these indicators on household survey data from Honduras. The
country sets multiple minima that have differed across regional, industrial, and firm-size
categories. Additionally, minimum wages only cover some workers. Following Honduran
legislation, I define covered employees as private-sector wage earners and uncovered
workers as the self-employed. Jointly, these occupations represent more than two thirds
of the total workforce. The data cover seven years (2005–2011), providing information on
more than 150,000 workers (approximately 22,000 per year).
Using this data, I investigate two issues. First, I explore heterogeneity in industry-
level compliance, highlighting urban-rural differences and duality in minimum wage
coverage. Second, since previous literature is mainly concerned with how variations
in enforcement affect compliance, I instead focus on how higher minimum wages
change extensive and intensive compliance by taking advantage of a large unexpected
increase.
Findings from this study contribute to previous literature by providing new estimates
of minimum wage violations and their depth. While a few studies have analyzed hetero-
geneity in compliance, further evidence is required to fully understand this phenomenon.
Moreover, there remains almost no knowledge about whether and how compliance
responds to rising wage floors. Lastly, the broader minimum wage literature may bene-
fit from a more profound study of compliance since it is a key dimension of this policy.
Addressing these gaps would help researchers better understand minimum wages in
developing countries and inform policymakers on how to enhance the tractability of labor
market institutions.
Results show substantial heterogeneity in non-compliance across industries, location,
and coverage status inHonduras. Despite a generalized level of violations, some industries
comply more than others, especially in urban areas. Findings also support that the depth
of non-compliance captures different factors than its incidence. Compliance worsens after
minimum wage hikes, since violations at the extensive and intensive margin increase sig-
nificantly. There is suggestive evidence of partial compliance in the urban covered sector
but it seems minimum wages are not complied with in the rural covered sector and for
uncovered workers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the litera-
ture on minimum wage compliance in developing countries. Section 3 describes the
Honduran labor market and its minimum wage policy. Section 4 presents the data
and empirical strategy. Section 5 analyzes heterogeneity in minimum wage compli-
ance. Section 6 studies how extensive and intensive compliance respond to a large
minimum wage hike. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses directions for future
research.
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2 Minimumwage compliance in developing countries
An implicit assumption when settingminimumwages is that there will be full compliance.
Empirically, this is not always true. Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) first debunked this myth
in the US, finding that over a third of workers earned sub-minimum wages. Therefore,
the outlook for complete compliance is less encouraging in developing countries where
enforcement is more lax (Grimshaw and Miozzo 2003).
Non-compliance usually arises because enforcement is weak and compliance costly to
firms.2 Incentives to comply depend on a) the level of minimum wages compared to
average wages, b) the elasticity of labor demand, and c) the associated penalties. Fur-
ther complexities develop when countries set multiple minimum wages that vary across
regions (Ashenfelter and Smith 1979), industries (Asongu and Jellal 2015), and where only
some workers are covered (Maloney and Mendez 2004).
Basu et al. (2010) discuss the role of enforcement and compliance when evaluating min-
imum wage policies. They show that labor market effects will depend on both the value
of minima and their enforcement level. Hence, two countries with the same wage floor
but different levels of compliance may experience substantially different consequences.
Unfortunately, most minimum wage studies grant insufficient attention to these issues.
Only recently has some research begun to address this gap.
Descriptive studies include Maloney and Mendez (2004), Rani et al. (2013), and Del
Carpio and Pabon (2014). Estimates show that between 16–50% of workers are paid below
mandated minima, so full compliance is not supported by the data. Additionally, these
rates tend to differ between and within countries (Neumark andWascher 2008). Compli-
ance levels seem to depend on specific features of the labormarket, including institutional
factors, industry-specific attributes, location, and worker characteristics.
Other work has focused on estimating the causal effect of higher enforcement on com-
pliance. Ronconi (2010) finds that increasing the number of labor inspectors in Argentina
raises minimum wage compliance. Similar findings are reported for Brazil (Almeida and
Carneiro 2009) and Costa Rica (Gindling et al. 2015), but no relationship is found in South
Africa (Bhorat et al. 2012a). Some of these studies also find that higher compliance may
lead to employment declines. Therefore, non-compliance may be tolerated by govern-
ments to mitigate job loss, leading to an equilibrium state with partial minimum wage
compliance (Dinkelman and Ranchhod 2012).
The majority of this evidence is obtained by counting how many workers earn
sub-minimum wages. As previously mentioned, this fails to capture the depth of non-
compliance. To overcome such issues, Bhorat et al. (2013) proposed using the axiomatic
FGT poverty measures (Foster et al. 1984) as “violation indices”. Under this view, themain
outcomes are wages and the poverty line is the mandated wage floor. These violation
indices summarize how many workers are underpaid (incidence) but also how far their
wages are from the minimum (depth), allowing us to distinguish between compliance at
extensive and intensive margins.
Since the introduction of these indices, several papers have quantified them. Bhorat
et al. (2012b) study the case of South Africa, where they find that on average, 44 percent
of workers earn sub-minimum wages and these individuals have an average shortfall that
is 35% of the minimum wage. Rani et al. (2013) estimate that workers in their sample of
eleven countries are underpaid between 25–50%, or equivalently, earn at most 0.50–0.75
of the minimumwage. Kanbur et al. (2013) evaluate violations in Chile, finding that 18.2%
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of workers are paid below the minimum, with an average shortfall of 24.5%. Most of these
studies find heterogeneity in violations and their depth across industries and employee
characteristics.
Not all available research is solely concerned with estimating the indices. For instance,
Bhorat et al. (2012a) evaluate the determinants of the incidence and depth of non-
compliance. Their results indicate that a variety of factors impact on minimum wage
violations, including individual, industry, firm-level/contractual, and spatial characteris-
tics. Some of these attributes are found to be significant markers for the incidence of
non-compliance, but not its depth.
Overall, the compliance literature has provided three main findings. First, while stricter
enforcement can raise compliance, it may also lower employment. Hence, some non-
compliance may be tolerated to achieve distributional goals. Second, we should be
concerned both with the incidence of non-compliance and its depth since they are deter-
mined by different underlying factors. Last, there is marked heterogeneity in compliance
rates within countries. However, other directions need to be explored. On one hand, while
existing studies analyze heterogeneity across industries, fewer have focused on disparities
across location and coverage status. On the other, there remains almost no evidence on
whether and how extensive and intensive compliance respond to rising minima. In what
follows, I investigate these matters using data from Honduras.
3 Honduras’s labor market andminimumwage policy
Honduras is the third poorest country in Latin America after Haiti and Nicaragua
(Cordero 2009). In 2012, 61% of the adult population (15–65) was in the labor force,
of which 58.5% were employed and 4% unemployed. Employed individuals are occu-
pied in four broad categories: wage earners (42.5%), self-employed (35.5%), unpaid family
workers (11.2%), and employers (10.8%).
Minimum wages have been part of the labor code in Honduras since 1974. They are
regulated by the General Directorate of Wages (DGS, in Spanish), which belongs to the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Mandated minima are negotiated each year by a
commission of Government, employer, and worker representatives. If no agreement is
achieved, a final decision is taken by the executive branch. Official minimum wages are
then published as decrees in the Senate’s Newspaper, La Gaceta.3
From the legislation, wemay identify some distinctive characteristics of Honduran wage
minima. First, multiple minimum wages exist at the same time. Up to 37 different wage
floors have coincided, varying by location, industry, and firm size. Second, Honduras sets
daily floors. According to the DGS, full-time employees should be paid 30 daily minimum
wages per month. Third, the covered sector consists of wage earners in private firms.4
This implies that the self-employed, unpaid family workers, and employers are not cov-
ered by minimum wages. Fourth, workers who receive food or housing may be paid 80%
of the minimum and 70% if provided both. Last, average minimum wage changes are
indexed to inflation and productivity.
Figure 1 plots mean minimum wages, living costs, and the poverty line, beginning
in 1990 for which data on all three concepts are available. Average minimum wages in
Honduras have usually been set above the poverty line, but systematically below the esti-
mated cost of living. Three broad periods may be discerned from the figure. First, from
1990–1998, average minimum wages were relatively unchanged. Second, increases were
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Fig. 1 Honduran minimum wages, cost of living, and the poverty line, 1990–2012. Source: General Directorate
of Wages, Ministry of Labor. http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/organizacion/dgt-1/direccion-general-de-salarios/
leyes-y-acuerdos-sobre-fijaciondel-salario-minimo
higher during 1999–2008, stabilizing average minima between the poverty line and living
costs. Finally, mean wage floors have risen substantially in recent years.
Figure 2 depicts these patterns more clearly by presenting the ratio of average minimum
wages to mean wages and living costs. In comparison to other Latin American countries,
wage floors have more bite in Honduras (Maloney and Mendez 2004). Moreover, they
have increased significantly throughout the period, especially in 2009.
Fig. 2 Ratio of average minimum wages to mean wages and cost of living, 1990–2012. Source: General
Directorate of Wages, Ministry of Labor. http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/organizacion/dgt-1/direccion-general-
de-salarios/estadisticas
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In that year, president Manuel Zelaya decreed a 50 percent increase in the average real
minimum wage when negotiations between commission members broke down. Addi-
tionally, the structure of minimum wages was modified to facilitate their delivery. It went
from 19minima set by industry firm-size categories to 2 regional floors, urban and rural.5
This policy gave no time for anticipation effects, since it was announced on December
23rd, decreed on the 27th, and took effect four days later.6 Furthermore, it was unrelated
to aggregate economic and labor market conditions, as (Ham, A: The Effects of Min-
imum Wages in Dual Labor Markets with Non-Compliance: Evidence from Honduras,
unpublished) shows.
How are minimum wages enforced? Honduras has 130 inspectors in 20 regional offices
to monitor labor code violations. This falls just short of the inspector per worker thresh-
old recommended by the ILO (Ronconi 2012).7 Employers are randomly visited to assess
compliance with minimum wages and other regulations. When firms commit an infrac-
tion, they are charged fines between 1000–5000 Lempiras (US$50–250), which may be
higher depending on the type of firm. Penalties apply for the incidence of minimum wage
violations, but are unrelated to the depth by which workers are underpaid. Gindling and
Terrell (2009) find evidence of effective enforcement in the large firm covered sector, but
not for small firms or the uncovered sector.
We should expect such high minima that are weakly enforced to result in non-
compliance. In fact, this is what previous studies find. Gindling and Terrell (2009, and
2010) estimate that 30.6% of covered wage earners earn sub-minimumwages, with higher
non-compliance by small firm employers. In a companion paper (Ham, A: The Effects
of Minimum Wages in Dual Labor Markets with Non-Compliance: Evidence from Hon-
duras, unpublished), I estimate these measures on more recent data and find that the
average incidence of violations in the covered sector has risen to 44.1%, and is worse in
the small firm covered sector and rural areas. However, several questions remain unan-
swered byHonduranminimumwage research: i) how heterogeneous is compliance across
industries?, ii) what is the depth by which workers are underpaid?, and iii) how did the
incidence and depth of violations respond to the 2009 minimum wage update?
4 Data, sample, and empirical strategy
4.1 Data
To answer these questions, I employ nationally representative data from Honduras’s
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples (EPHPM). EPHPM surveys
are conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INE) two times per year, in May and
September. They gather detailed individual-level information on wages and employment
for the Honduran population. Twelve waves from 2005–2011 are joined for this study.8
All variables of interest are identically defined to ensure comparability across waves.
The survey data are complemented with minimum wage values published in La Gaceta
and consumer price indices from the Honduran Central Bank to deflate minima and
wages.9 Using the decrees, I assign the corresponding wage floor to each worker based
on their self-reported industry and firm size. Since the surveys identify whether indivi-
duals receive food and/or housing from their employer, minimum wages are adjusted for
these offsets. Following Gindling and Terrell (2009), I construct real hourly minimum
wages by calculating deflated monthly values and computing Hourly MW = Monthly
MW /(44 × 4.3).10
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4.2 Sample
The analysis will focus on covered and uncovered workers in Honduras. Following the
decrees, the former encompass private-sector wage earners and the second consist of the
self-employed.11 About 70% of all workers are occupied in these categories, each repre-
senting roughly a third of total employment. I further restrict the sample to adults (15–65)
working at most 72 h per week and whose wages lie below the 99th percentile. This leaves
complete data for 102,599 covered employees and 52,056 uncovered workers.
Individuals are further identified by location to enrich the analysis. As argued by
Gindling and Terrell (2009), resources devoted to guarantee minimum wage compli-
ance in Honduras are limited, especially away from large cities. Approximately 55.5% of
the sample lives in urban areas. Covered employees are mostly located in cities, while
uncovered workers are a slight majority in rural Honduras. The four main worker types I
consider are distributed as follows: urban covered (37.9%), rural covered (26.3%), urban
uncovered (17.7%), and rural uncovered (18.1%).
The minimum wage decrees specify wage floors for ten industries: agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, utilities, construction, retail, transport, banking, services, and the export
(or maquila) sector. Table 1 presents the distribution of worker types across industries.
Urban covered employees in Honduras mostly work in retail, manufacturing, and the
maquila sector. Rural wage earners work in agriculture, construction, and retail. Urban
uncovered workers are typically employed in retail and manufacturing. Finally, the rural
self-employed are predominantly working agricultural and retail jobs.
4.3 Empirical strategy
To study the incidence and depth of minimum wage non-compliance in Honduras, I use
the violation indices proposed by Bhorat et al. (2013). They are usually represented by Vα ,
where α = {0, 1, 2}. Intuitively, the indices take individual violations of minimum wages









Table 1 Distribution of worker types by industry, average for 2005–2011
Covered Uncovered
Industry Urban Rural Urban Rural
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 5.03 52.39 4.05 40.87
Mining 0.22 0.62 0.22 0.39
Manufacturing 15.75 9.09 15.28 10.99
Utilities 0.52 0.40 0.06 0.02
Construction 10.86 10.02 4.66 2.43
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 28.44 9.55 47.49 30.76
Transport, storage, and communications 5.11 2.64 7.91 2.48
Banking, financial, and real estate services 9.70 2.31 3.28 0.53
Communal, social, and personal services 11.97 5.08 11.98 7.80
Export sector (Maquila) 12.40 7.88 5.06 3.74
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011
Notes: All statistics are weighted using survey provided expansion factors. Following Honduran minimum wage decrees, covered
employees are defined as private-sector wage earners and uncovered workers are the self-employed
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Here, wm is the hourly minimum wage and w is the actual hourly wage for workers in
the sample. The value of α captures differing degrees of “violation aversion”. Therefore,
α = 0 counts the fraction of workers that earn less than the minimum, α = 1 quantifies
the gap between actual pay and mandated minimum wages expressed as a fraction of the
minimum, and α = 2 squares this gap to give more weight to large deviations. In what
follows, I refer to these measures as the incidence (V0), depth (V1), and severity (V2) of
non-compliance, respectively.
Since V1 and V2 are not directly interpretable, I also provide estimates of an alter-
native indicator used by Bhorat et al. (2013) to quantify the depth of minimum wage
non-compliance: V1/V0. This ratio captures the percentage shortfall in the average pay of
underpaid workers from the minimum wage. In other words, workers earning less than
the mandated wage floor are paid on average V1/V0 percent below the minimum.
I bootstrap V0, V1/V0, and their changes to determine whether estimated differences in
extensive and intensive compliance are statistically significant. Therefore, point estimates
will be accompanied by 95% confidence intervals obtained from 500 replications.12
Estimates are presented in two parts. First, cross-sectional indices are calculated to
explore industry-level heterogeneity in minimum wage violations across location and
coverage status. The findings will characterize minimum wage non-compliance in the
Honduran labor market. Second, the time frame is split into two sub-periods, before and
after 2009, to study the effect of higher minimum wages on extensive and intensive com-
pliance. These results will identify which industries complied with the policy and which
ones did not by measuring changes in the incidence of violations (V0) and their shortfall
(V1/V0).
5 Heterogeneity in minimumwage violations
Before proceeding to the indices, Table 2 shows average real minimum wages (wm)
and actual wages (w) by industry for each worker type. During the period, average
minima were 9.39 Lempiras an hour, about US$0.94. Ratios between average wages
and the minimum for urban and rural covered (wage earning) employees are 1.47 and
0.85, respectively. Uncovered (self-employed) workers earn slightly less than wage earn-
ers and follow similar patterns across location. Estimated ratios for the self-employed
are 1.40 in urban areas and 0.83 in the rural sector. Therefore, Honduran workers
located in cities have average earnings above mandated wage floors while rural laborers
do not.
The table also highlights wage differences across industries. For instance, rural covered
workers employed in agriculture, construction, and retail earn below their correspond-
ing minimum but above this value in all remaining industries. Similar behavior may
be inferred from analyzing other worker types. This suggests that some industries are
complying with minimum wages more than others.
Another approach to describe minimum wage compliance is to plot wage distributions.
Given the multiplicity of wage floors in Honduras, Fig. 3 plots kernel density estimates
of the distribution of log hourly wages minus log minimum wages. This recenters the
distribution so that 0 = MW . If minima are enforced for a particular worker type, we
should see censoring from below at zero and a higher spike at this value compared to
other types.
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Table 2 Real minimum wages and actual wages by industry, average for 2005–2011
Covered Uncovered
Industry Minimum wage Urban Rural Urban Rural
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 8.38 9.48 5.96 6.43 5.04
Mining 9.56 14.23 11.71 13.06 6.13
Manufacturing 9.74 13.19 10.41 10.34 8.36
Utilities 11.02 16.40 11.86 9.43 6.53
Construction 9.52 11.15 8.83 14.81 12.57
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 9.64 12.44 9.09 13.37 9.74
Transport, storage, and communications 10.03 16.32 10.98 15.05 14.17
Banking, financial, and real estate services 10.64 18.28 11.68 26.21 17.88
Communal, social, and personal services 9.80 19.00 11.61 12.90 9.47
Export sector (Maquila) 9.18 12.41 11.08 11.75 7.19
Average 9.39 13.84 7.97 13.11 7.76
Source: Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011
Notes: All statistics are weighted using survey provided expansion factors. Values are deflated using the Honduran Central Bank’s
Consumer Price Index (Dec. 1999 = 100). The average real exchange rate for the period is approximately 10 Lempiras per 1 USD.
Following Honduran minimum wage decrees, covered employees are defined as private-sector wage earners and uncovered
workers are the self-employed
Spikes at theminimumwage are only evident for covered employees, especially in urban
areas. As expected in a labor market with high minima and weak enforcement, a sizable
fraction of wage earners are paid sub-minimum wages. Uncovered sector wage distribu-
tions show no sign of censoring at mandated minima and look very close to a normal
distribution, denoting that wage floors do not bind for self-employed workers. Despite
this fact, I maintain uncovered workers in the analysis to highlight wage differentials
across sectors.
Fig. 3 Kernel density distributions of log wages minus log minimum wages, average for 2005–2011. Source:
Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011. Weighted estimates. 0 represents the
minimum wage
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I now turn to the family of minimum wage violation indices (Vα) to quantify the extent
and depth of these violations. Recall that V0 captures compliance at the extensive margin
and V1/V0 measures violations at the intensive margin.
Table 3 presents estimates ofV0,V1,V2, andV1/V0. Panel A refers to covered employees
and Panel B to uncovered workers. Results indicate a generalized level of non-compliance.
In ascending order, 42.8% of the urban covered, 51.8% of the urban uncovered, 65% of
the rural covered, and 72% of rural uncovered workers earn sub-minimum wages. The
depth of these violations follow a similar pattern. In urban areas, covered workers earn
on average 32.4% below the minimum and the uncovered 50.5%. Shortfalls from the min-
imum are significantly worse in rural areas, where covered and uncovered workers are
underpaid by 43.1% and 64.1%, respectively.
Point estimates for the main violation indicators and their confidence intervals are
shown in Figs. 4 and 5. The dotted line plots the means in the preceding paragraph as a
reference point to compare industry-level deviations from average non-compliance.
Even though urban workers earn average wages above the minimum, non-compliance
fluctuates across industries. For instance, more than half the wage earners are
employed in retail, manufacturing, or construction; which have above average inci-
dence of violations. In turn, the transport, banking, services, and maquila industries
Table 3Minimum wage violation indices, average for 2005–2011
Urban Rural
Industry V0 V1 V2 V1/V0 V0 V1 V2 V1/V0
Panel A: Covered sector (Wage Earners)
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 0.638 0.279 0.161 0.437 0.773 0.365 0.219 0.472
Mining 0.409 0.192 0.119 0.469 0.558 0.204 0.108 0.366
Manufacturing 0.450 0.144 0.069 0.320 0.479 0.166 0.085 0.346
Utilities 0.456 0.132 0.055 0.289 0.587 0.219 0.109 0.374
Construction 0.538 0.212 0.119 0.394 0.605 0.254 0.147 0.419
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 0.463 0.147 0.071 0.319 0.549 0.212 0.113 0.385
Transport, storage, and communications 0.358 0.113 0.055 0.314 0.457 0.181 0.098 0.395
Banking, financial, and real estate services 0.353 0.088 0.034 0.249 0.478 0.135 0.059 0.283
Communal, social, and personal services 0.286 0.098 0.050 0.344 0.487 0.210 0.122 0.432
Export sector (Maquila) 0.361 0.080 0.030 0.221 0.438 0.091 0.034 0.209
Average 0.428 0.139 0.068 0.324 0.650 0.280 0.162 0.431
Panel B: Uncovered sector (Self-Employed)
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 0.779 0.567 0.467 0.729 0.851 0.627 0.518 0.738
Mining 0.500 0.196 0.106 0.391 0.810 0.409 0.276 0.506
Manufacturing 0.618 0.330 0.222 0.534 0.669 0.377 0.261 0.564
Utilities 0.634 0.410 0.291 0.647 - - - -
Construction 0.346 0.124 0.067 0.360 0.388 0.163 0.101 0.421
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 0.507 0.251 0.161 0.494 0.631 0.354 0.245 0.561
Transport, storage, and communications 0.402 0.148 0.077 0.369 0.432 0.187 0.108 0.434
Banking, financial, and real estate services 0.236 0.102 0.061 0.431 0.391 0.206 0.135 0.527
Communal, social, and personal services 0.564 0.291 0.188 0.515 0.657 0.351 0.232 0.535
Export sector (Maquila) 0.518 0.250 0.155 0.482 0.761 0.440 0.300 0.578
Average 0.518 0.261 0.171 0.505 0.720 0.462 0.352 0.641
Source: Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011
Notes: All statistics are weighted using survey provided expansion factors. Following Honduran minimum wage decrees, covered
employees are defined as private-sector wage earners and uncovered workers are the self-employed. Estimates are available for
industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker type
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Fig. 4 Incidence of minimum wage violations, average for 2005–2011. Source: Own calculations from pooled
EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011. Notes: 95% confidence intervals calculated by 500 bootstrap replications.
Estimates are available for industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker type. The dotted line
presents the average value of V0 for each worker type and may be found in the ‘Average’ rows in Table 3
Fig. 5 Shortfall of wages from the minimum wage, average for 2005–2011. Source: Own calculations from
pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011. Notes: 95% confidence intervals calculated by 500 bootstrap
replications. Estimates are available for industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker type. The
dotted line presents the average value of V1/V0 for each worker type and may be found in the ‘Average’ rows
in Table 3
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are more compliant. Uncovered workers show similar patterns, but violation indices are
larger.
Rural workers are also subject to heterogeneous compliance across industries. Covered
employees are mostly employed in agriculture, construction, and retail, where non-
compliance rates are 77.3%, 60.5%, and 54.9%, respectively. Rural uncovered workers fare
worse, since most of them are employed in agriculture where 85.1% are paid less than the
legislated minimum wage.
This evidence suggests that industries that employ more individuals are less com-
pliant. Nonetheless, correlation coefficients between employment shares and the inci-
dence of non-compliance are –0.045 and –0.108 and insignificant for covered and
uncovered workers in urban areas. In rural Honduras, however, this relationship is
positive. Estimated coefficients are 0.598 for covered wage earners and 0.442 for uncov-
ered self-employed workers, and significant for the former. Hence, industries that
employ a larger proportion of wage earners in rural areas have higher non-compliance
rates.
What about compliance at the intensive margin? In urban areas, estimates of V1/V0
reveal sizable differences across industries. Covered workers are underpaid by 32% in
manufacturing, 31.9% in retail, and 22.1% in maquilas. Uncovered laborers in retail, man-
ufacturing, and services earn 49.4%, 53.4%, and 51.5% below the minimum wage. In rural
areas, the depth of violations is higher across the board. Better paid industries include
construction and transport, while agriculture underpays the most. Wage earners receive
47.2% and 38.5% below mandated minima in agricultural and retail jobs. Self-employed
workers in agricultural occupations earn 74% below the minimum wage.
This implies that underpaid wage earners make at most 0.78 of the minimum in urban
areas and 0.64 in the rural sector. Self-employed workers earning sub-minimum wages
make at most 0.79 of this value in cities and 0.58 outside them. Once again, the corre-
lation between industry employment shares and intensive compliance shows that rural
industries significantly underpay wage earners, with a coefficient of 0.645.
Do V0 and V1 rank industries the same or do they capture different under-
lying factors? Rank correlations between both measures are high, but imperfect.
Coefficients are 0.830, 0.927, 0.988, and 0.891 for urban covered, urban uncov-
ered, rural covered, and rural uncovered workers. Therefore, a high incidence of
violations in one industry does not always imply a stronger depth of the vio-
lation, especially in the urban covered sector that seems to be complying with
minimum wages. In less compliant sectors, incidence and depth are more closely
related.
6 Violation responses tominimumwage hikes
In 2009, Manuel Zelaya raised real minimum wages by 50% and changed their structure
from industry firm-size categories to location-based floors. Figure 6 shows that this policy
induced different increases across industries. Furthermore, urban workers were meant to
receive higher wage floors than their rural counterparts.
I examine how extensive and intensive compliance responded to this large increase by
comparing violationmeasures before (2005–2008) and after (2009–2011) the policy. Since
minima legally apply to wage earners, I focus the analysis on that sector.
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Fig. 6 Industry-level changes in real minimum wages, before and after 2009. Source: Honduran minimum
wage decrees, 2005–2011
Before the policy, non-compliance in the covered sector was 33.5% and 58.7% for urban
and rural employees, as Table 4 shows.Wage earners made at most 0.72 of mandatedmin-
ima in cities and 0.61 outside them. Estimates also confirm heterogeneity in compliance
across industries, consistent with findings in the previous section.
How do non-compliance rates respond to higherminimumwages? Figure 7 summarizes
these results. The average number of covered workers paid below theminimumwage rose
Table 4 Changes in minimum wage violations for covered workers, before and after 2009
V0 V1/V0
Industry Pre Post Difference Pre Post Difference
Panel A: Urban areas
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 0.538 0.762 0.224 0.376 0.490 0.115
Mining 0.291 0.614 0.323 0.415 0.512 0.097
Manufacturing 0.333 0.618 0.286 0.275 0.355 0.079
Utilities 0.356 0.589 0.233 0.308 0.274 –0.034
Construction 0.404 0.724 0.321 0.325 0.447 0.122
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 0.343 0.607 0.263 0.279 0.346 0.067
Transport, storage, and communications 0.250 0.497 0.247 0.287 0.332 0.046
Banking, financial, and real estate services 0.268 0.461 0.193 0.231 0.263 0.032
Communal, social, and personal services 0.187 0.404 0.217 0.313 0.361 0.048
Export sector (Maquila) 0.391 0.307 -0.084 0.220 0.222 0.002
Average 0.335 0.552 0.218 0.282 0.359 0.077
Panel B: Rural areas
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 0.723 0.833 0.111 0.436 0.510 0.074
Mining 0.508 0.616 0.108 0.333 0.399 0.066
Manufacturing 0.404 0.582 0.178 0.293 0.397 0.105
Utilities 0.471 0.692 0.221 0.406 0.354 –0.052
Construction 0.503 0.741 0.238 0.361 0.471 0.110
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 0.461 0.644 0.183 0.333 0.425 0.092
Transport, storage, and communications 0.350 0.580 0.230 0.359 0.421 0.062
Banking, financial, and real estate services 0.457 0.502 0.045 0.254 0.315 0.061
Communal, social, and personal services 0.388 0.597 0.209 0.399 0.457 0.057
Export sector (Maquila) 0.437 0.440 0.003 0.211 0.205 –0.006
Average 0.587 0.727 0.139 0.392 0.469 0.077
Source: Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011
Notes: All statistics are weighted using survey provided expansion factors. Pre refers to 2005–2008 and Post to 2009–2011.
Covered workers are defined as private-sector wage earners, following Honduran minimum wage decrees. Estimates are available
for industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker type
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Fig. 7 Changes in the incidence of minimum wage violations, before and after 2009. Source: Own
calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011. Notes: 95% confidence intervals calculated by 500
bootstrap replications. Estimates are available for industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker
type. The horizontal line is the benchmark of no change
by 21.8 percentage points in urban areas and 13.9 in the rural sector. While exact changes
differ across industries, employers commit more violations after Zelaya’s decreed change.
Hence, higher minima lower compliance at the extensive margin.
As before, I calculate correlations between industry employment shares and the change
in non-compliance rates. For urban employees the coefficient is –0.087 and is not sig-
nificant. For rural wage earners, the correlation is 0.218. Therefore, there is low negative
correlation between the fraction of workers in each industry and extensive compliance in
urban areas, but a positive relationship for rural areas.
Figure 8 plots industry-level changes in the depth of non-compliance. On average,
wage earners were underpaid by 7.7 percentage points more after the policy. Estimated
changes in compliance at the intensive margin are significant, denoting that higher min-
imum wages lead to higher shortfalls from wage floors. Correlations between the share
of covered workers and the depth of non-compliance are positive in both locations. The
coefficient is 0.129 in urban areas and 0.390 in rural areas.
How do these findings compare to the uncovered sector? Overall, changes in violations
are higher for self-employed workers. The number of individuals earning sub-minimum
wages rises by 28.7 and 16.3 percentage points in urban and rural Honduras. Additionally,
violation depth grows by 9.7 and 8.2 percentage points, as Table 5 shows.
To best interpret the implications of these changes in compliance, we need to know how
labor market outcomes react to changing minimumwages.13 In related research (Ham, A:
The Effects of MinimumWages in Dual Labor Markets with Non-Compliance: Evidence
from Honduras, unpublished), I find effects that are consistent with the dual-sector min-
imum wage model. The covered sector shows employment declines and higher wages,
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Fig. 8 Changes in the shortfall of wages from minimum wages, before and after 2009. Source: Own
calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011. Notes: 95% confidence intervals calculated by 500
bootstrap replications. Estimates are available for industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker
type. The horizontal line is the benchmark of no change
with workers migrating towards the uncovered sector where they lower average wages
due to increased labor supply.
While the results in this section reject full compliance withminimumwages, they would
support partial compliance if two conditions are met. First, the density at the minimum
wage spike in the covered sector wage distribution must be higher after the policy. Cen-
soring from below at this value is not necessary since as Basu et al. (2010) explain, some
non-compliance may be tolerated to achieve distributional goals. Second, wage distribu-
tions in sectors where minimum wages do not apply should shift to the left, but maintain
their shape. To check these conditions, I plot the distribution of log hourly wages minus
log minimum wages before and after the wage floor hike in Fig. 9.14
In the covered sector distributions, the spike at the minimum wage shows evidence
of growth in urban areas. This shift is consistent with the result in (Ham, A: The
Effects of MinimumWages in Dual Labor Markets with Non-Compliance: Evidence from
Honduras, unpublished) that average wages increased for covered employees. One inter-
pretation of this finding is that urban employers try to comply with minimum wages, but
manage to do so imperfectly. Because these estimates are drawn from repeated cross-
sections, higher observed wages may be due to one of three reasons: i) some workers
are paid the new minimum wage, ii) some accept higher sub-minimum wages to keep
their jobs, and iii) some lose their jobs and are no longer included in the sample to com-
pute average wages. Whatever the reason, the evidence suggests partial compliance in the
urban covered sector.
Results for the remaining worker types confirm that rural wage earners and uncovered
workers are not receiving minimum wages, evidenced by leftward shifts in their distribu-
tions with no visible changes in shape. The uncovered sector is not entitled to minimum
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Table 5 Changes in minimum wage violations for uncovered workers, before and after 2009
V0 V1/V0
Industry Pre Post Difference Pre Post Difference
Panel A: Urban areas
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 0.664 0.836 0.172 0.673 0.751 0.078
Mining 0.341 0.773 0.432 0.343 0.427 0.084
Manufacturing 0.493 0.752 0.258 0.481 0.572 0.091
Utilities 0.639 0.628 –0.010 0.700 0.573 –0.127
Construction 0.190 0.559 0.368 0.301 0.387 0.085
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 0.354 0.671 0.316 0.427 0.532 0.105
Transport, storage, and communications 0.239 0.587 0.348 0.325 0.390 0.064
Banking, financial, and real estate services 0.150 0.341 0.191 0.400 0.447 0.047
Communal, social, and personal services 0.442 0.684 0.242 0.436 0.564 0.129
Export sector (Maquila) 0.526 0.508 –0.018 0.463 0.507 0.044
Average 0.378 0.666 0.287 0.444 0.541 0.097
Panel B: Rural areas
Agriculture, fishing, and hunting 0.803 0.870 0.067 0.713 0.747 0.034
Mining 0.751 0.858 0.107 0.397 0.584 0.187
Manufacturing 0.589 0.748 0.159 0.524 0.595 0.071
Utilities - - - - - -
Construction 0.243 0.559 0.315 0.388 0.437 0.049
Retail, hotels, and restaurants 0.553 0.713 0.161 0.527 0.589 0.061
Transport, storage, and communications 0.328 0.535 0.207 0.367 0.475 0.108
Banking, financial, and real estate services 0.425 0.355 –0.071 0.551 0.496 –0.055
Communal, social, and personal services 0.588 0.724 0.136 0.496 0.565 0.069
Export sector (Maquila) 0.761 0.760 –0.001 0.564 0.599 0.035
Average 0.626 0.789 0.163 0.589 0.671 0.082
Source: Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011
Notes: All statistics are weighted using survey provided expansion factors. Pre refers to 2005–2008 and Post to 2009–2011.
Uncovered workers are defined as self-employed workers, following Honduran minimum wage decrees. Estimates are available
for industries that have at least 10 observations for each worker type
wages, so no compliance is expected. However, the rural covered sector shows no signs of
compliance, although wage floors should apply to these workers.
7 Conclusions
This article analyzes minimum wage violations at the extensive and intensive margin in
Honduras, a developing country with highwage floors that are weakly enforced. Following
recent research, I compute the family of indices proposed by Bhorat et al. (2013) on house-
hold survey data to investigate two issues. First, I explore cross-sectional heterogeneity
in non-compliance. Second, I quantify compliance responses to minimum wage hikes by
comparing indices before and after a large unexpected increase.
Cross-sectional findings reveal substantial differences in extensive and intensive non-
compliance across industries, location, and coverage status. The urban covered sector is
mostly compliant with minimum wage laws but the rural covered and uncovered sec-
tors are not. Moreover, while rural wage earners are legally covered, industries who hire
the most workers also have the highest non-compliance rates and underpay the most.
Rank correlations support that the depth of non-compliance may be driven by differ-
ent underlying factors than its incidence, suggesting that both dimensions are relevant to
understand how minimum wages work in Honduras.
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Fig. 9 Kernel density distributions of log wages minus log minimum wages, before and after 2009. Source:
Own calculations from pooled EPHPM surveys for 2005–2011. Weighted estimates. 0 represents the
minimum wage
Violations increase after minimum wage hikes, since non-compliance at the extensive
and intensive margin grows for all workers. There is suggestive evidence of partial compli-
ance only in the urban covered sector. Given the scarce resources devoted to monitoring
labor laws and lower enforcement in rural areas (Gindling and Terrell 2009), these results
are unsurprising but worrisome. In addition to the finding that rural industries who hire
the most workers have the highest non-compliance rates and underpay themost, the rural
sector represents a key area for policy intervention.
These results provide new empirical evidence to the literature on compliance with
labor institutions. In particular, these estimates may help design enforcement policies,
since they identify what industries are committing the most infractions. The success-
ful National Campaign for Minimum Wages in Costa Rica may serve as a starting point
(Gindling et al. 2015). Additionally, compliance responses to minimum wage hikes con-
firm that policy decisions must take into account the value of mandated minima and
their level of enforcement (Basu et al. 2010). Lastly, more detailed studies of compli-
ance are necessary to understand the labor market effects of minimum wages. In the
case of Honduras, it sets high minimum wages but does not commit resources to enforce
them, leading to higher efficiency losses than equity gains (Ham, A: The Effects of Min-
imum Wages in Dual Labor Markets with Non-Compliance: Evidence from Honduras,
unpublished).
Further research is required to fully comprehend compliance with minimum wages
and labor laws in general. On one hand, using panel data may shed further light on how
compliance adjusts to changing minima and/or higher enforcement. Results from such
studies may help understand why some sectors are only partially complying with labor
laws. On the other, compliance might also differ between covered workers in ‘precarious’
jobs often considered to be ‘informal’ (Gasparini and Tornarolli 2009). Labor informality
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is a growing concern in developing countries, and is not restricted solely to the unreg-
ulated or shadow economy. Hopefully, more evidence in these and other directions will
help researchers and policymakers ensure that labor market institutions fulfill their main
objective: to protect the most vulnerable workers.
Endnotes
1A summary of other commonly implemented labor institutions may be found in Blau
and Kahn (1999).
2Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Grenier (1982), Chang and Ehrlich (1985), and Yaniv
(2001) model firm decisions in competitive markets. Yaniv (1988) and Basu et al. (2010)
study non-competitive markets.
3Minimum wage decrees are publicly available at the DGS website: http://www.
trabajo.gob.hn/organizacion/dgt-1/direccion-general-de-salarios#!/tcmbck.
4Public-sector wage earners are indirectly covered since they are paid in multiples of
the minimum wage. However, these employees are subject to a different wage grid. See
Gindling and Terrell (2009).
5Industries are defined in the minimum wage decrees using the 1-digit ISIC
classification and include: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction,
retail, transport, banking, services, and the export (or maquila) sector. Except for the last
industry which has one floor, minima were set for small (1–15) and large (16+) firms
before the 2009 update. However, further changes have ensued.
6Media coverage highlights that employers felt this measure was abruptly “imposed” on
them. See http://www.hondurasnews.com/minimum-wage-increase-bad-for-economy/.
7In 2012, more than three million Hondurans were active. A simple calculation of the
ratio of inspectors to workers yields roughly 1:23,500. Ideally, this relationship should be
1:20,000 (Weil 2008).
8Both May and September surveys are used to mitigate seasonality issues.
Unfortunately, no survey was carried out in September 2009 due to the country’s
political crisis.
9Most minimum wage changes became effective on the first day of each calendar year,
except in 2010, when the update took effect on September 1st. Therefore, the 2009
scheme was still applicable at the time when fieldwork for the May 2010 survey was
undertaken.
10This procedure takes into consideration that full-time employees must work 44 h
per week for 4.3 weeks (which amounts to roughly 30 days). Calculated values for the 19
industry firm-size categories may be found in (Ham, A: The Effects of MinimumWages
in Dual Labor Markets with Non-Compliance: Evidence from Honduras, unpublished).
11I omit public-sector wage earners who are indirectly covered, as well as employers
and unpaid family workers who are uncovered.
12Bootstrapped estimates are only available for industries that have at least 10
observations per worker type. For instance, utility workers in the rural uncovered sector
represent only 0.02% of the workforce in these areas or 6 observations from 2005–2011.
Since estimated confidence intervals from small sample sizes are imprecise, such cases
are omitted.
13I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
14Another test of partial compliance has been proposed by Dinkelman and Ranchhod
(2012). However, it cannot be implemented here because this test is only informative
when there are no large employment declines in response to minimum wages, which is
not the case in Honduras.
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